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STATE ACTION

1985(3) and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment must be of some
significance and gives credence to the argument that Congress intended
section 1985(3) to protect fourteenth-amendment-based rights against
private interference.
Besides the court's failure to deal with the scope of Griffin's
criteria, the Bellamy decision has other shortcomings. The Fourth
Circuit virtually ignored the Griffin framework of section 1985(3)
interpretation, while relying on older and less relevant cases. The court
did not consider whether the requisite class discrimination was satisfied.
Nor was Griffin's policy of giving civil rights statutes a broad interpretation considered or followed. Finally, the minimum consideration given
Griffin was based on a misinterpretation of the Supreme Courts holding
in that case. Although section 1985(3) has made great strides since
1971 towards becoming a vital civil rights statute, the Bellamy decision
indicates that, at least until the Supreme Court clearly defines the scope
of the statute, application of section 1985(3) will be greatly restricted.
SUSAN C. MALPASS

Constitutional Law-State Action-Golden v. Biscayne Bay
Yacht Club: Preventing Discrimination by Private Clubs
Using the bay bottom off Miami as a vantage point, the Fifth
Circuit has launched a state action torpedo to sink the membership
practices of a private yacht club. Although the Supreme Court has
refrained from answering whether the membership policies of private
clubs can be attacked on state action grounds,' the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found the question squarely presented to it in Golden v.
Biscayne Bay Yacht Club2 and answered the question in the affirmative.
In Golden the court held that leasing publicly owned bay bottom land to
a yacht club for its docks constituted sufficient state involvement to
unleash a fourteenth amendment attack on racial and religious discrimination in the club's membership practices.3
1. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166-68 (1972), the Supreme
Court refused on standing grounds to hear an attack on allegedly discriminatory
membership practices of a private social club.
2. 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975).
3. Id. at 352 (alternative holding).
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The Biscayne Bay Yacht Club (hereinafter referred to as the
Club) is a private social club with waterfront and dock facilities on
Biscayne Bay, Florida.' The Club had utilized these facilities for thirty
years when in 1962 the City of Miami asserted title to the bay bottom
under the Club's docks. Since 1962 the Club has leased the bay
bottom from the city for one dollar per year. The most recent lease
included provisions prohibiting the Club from discriminating on the
basis of race, religion or national origin against persons desiring access
to the leased facilities and from requiring applicants for membership
to be sponsored as a condition for consideration. 7 Despite this antidiscrimination proviso in the lease, membership in the Club has been
by sponsorship and upon approval of the Club's Board of Governors
by use of a three-vote veto system.'
Two plaintiffs, a black and a Jew, separately sought and were denied membership applications because of the sponsorship requirement.9
Plaintiffs, alleging that the Club's membership policies were discriminatory, subsequently sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Club, the City of Miami and its mayor and commissioners under 42
U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983 and Title II ° of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.11 The district court, finding that the sponsorship policy discriminated against black and Jewish applicants and that the lease provided
sufficient state involvement to meet the fourteenth amendment state
action requirement enjoined the Club under section 1983 from denying
membership to persons solely on grounds of race or religious affilia12
tion.'
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals' 3 for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the sponsorship
policy, in light of the fact that there had been no black or Jewish
members since the Club's inception, 14 operated in practice to exclude
4. Id. at 347.

5. Id.
6. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
7. Id. at 104041. The provisions were pursuant to two City of Miami ordinances. Id.
8. 521 F.2d at 347.
9. 370 F. Supp. at 1041.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970).
11. 370 F. Supp. at 104041.
12. Id. at 1042-44.
13. The court of appeals split 2-1. Chief Judge Brown wrote for the majority;
Judge Coleman dissented.
14. The Commodore of the Jamaica Yacht Club, a black, was an honorary
member. 521 F.2d at 347.
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blacks and Jews. 15
The majority devoted the bulk of its opinion to a determination of
whether sufficient connection existed between the Club and the City of

Miami to satisfy the "color of law" state action prerequisite

6

for relief

under section 1983.17 Noting that the Supreme Court has required that
this examination be conducted by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances' 8 on a case-by-case basis, the court studied the similarities
between the facts of the instant case and other cases involving discrimi-

nation by private individuals. 19 The court determined that there was
sufficient state involvement present in Golden to constitute state action
on either of two grounds.

First, the court held that the leasing of

publicly owned property ipso facto established a sufficient nexus between private and public conduct for a finding of state action when the
15. Id. at 348-49. In 1970, Dade County (in which the Club is located) had a
combined black and Jewish population of thirty percent 370 F. Supp. at 1043. The
court also noted that the district judge could have found that racial and religious
discrimination resulted from the Club's use of a three-vote veto. 521 F.2d at 349 n.10.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides for a civil action for "deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws" by any person
acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State
....." Section 1983's "color of law" requirement is generally equated with the state
action concept of the fourteenth amendment. Originally, there was a controversy over
whether a cause of action could lie under section 1983 against anyone other than a state
official acting pursuant to state law. A landmark case, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), settled the issue in favor of a broader reading of the statute. Subsequent cases
have equated section 1983's "color of law" concept to the fourteenth amendment state
action concept. Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1039 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Green v.Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 1973); see, e.g.,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
17. See 521 F.2d at 349-53. The majority deemed "it unnecessary to reach the
question whether the Club's admission policies also violated § 1981 and Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a." 521 F.2d at 348.
The Biscayne Bay Yacht Club would probably qualify for the private club exemption from Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
The only Supreme Court case interpreting the scope of this exemption, Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969), laid out three criteria that must be satisfied to gain -the exemption:
1) a non-business character, 2) membership control over club finances and governance,
and 3) genuine selectivity over admissions. Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private
Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 449, 492 (1974). The Biscayne Bay Yacht Club
would easily satisfy these requirements. See 370 F. Supp. at 1040-41.
The question of the applicability of section 1981 to private clubs may be illuminated
by a case pending in the Supreme Court, Runyon v. McCrary, 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D.
Va. 1973), modified, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S.
Nov. 11, 1975) (No. 62). For a discussion of section 1981's applicablility to private
clubs, see Note, 74 CoLtrm. L. REv., supra, at 494-95.
18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
19. See 521 F.2d at 349-53.
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private entity practiced racial discrimination.2" Second, in a somewhat
confusing discussion of the facts in Golden, the court seemed to find
that the Club and the city were engaged in a mutually beneficial joint
venture.2 1 To establish this symbiotic relationship the court pointed to
the consensual nature of the lease between the city and the Club, to the
benefits provided to the city by the existence of private dock facilities
which relieved pressure on crowded public dock facilities, and to the

benefits that the lease afforded the Club through making possible docks
which were essential to the Club's existence and by providing financial
assistance through the token rental fee.2 2
Since the Nineteenth Century Civil Rights Cases,28 the fourteenth

amendment has protected citizens from the denial by states of due
process or the equal protection of the law but has erected "no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."24
In spite of this limitation the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have constructed three main theories to find the state action

needed to reach and proscribe some types of private discrimination. Two
of these theories-the public function theory, designed to reach private

conduct that has taken on the character of governmental activity, 25 and
the state encouragement or authorization theory, designed to reach
private action taken pursuant to government encouragement or authorization 26-- are not apposite in GoldenY'
20. See id. at 352.
21. See id. at 351-52.
22. See id.
23. 109 U.S.3 (1883).
24. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (footnote omitted).
25. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946).
26. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S.267 (1963).
27. The public function theory would be applicable in Golden only if providing
dock facilities could be characterized as a governmental function. This characterization
would be problematic here because private conduct has been found to constitute state
action under the public function theory generally when the public entities are the sole
and usual providers of the particular service. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 30002 (1966). For a full discussion of what constitutes state action under this theory, see
Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 CoLrJm. L.RFv.656, 690-98 (1974).
The state encouragement theory would probably not be applicable in Golden
because, far from encouraging private discrimination, the City of Miami attempted to
prevent it by including in the lease the anti-discrimination provisions mentioned in the
text accompanying note 7 supra. Any attempt to find state authorization in Golden on
the theory that the city's acquiescence in the discriminatory conduct implied state
authorization would be precluded by the plaintiffs' failure to show that city officials had
knowledge of the Club's discriminatory practices. See 370 F. Supp. at 1044. But see
text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
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The third theory-the state involvement or "nexus!' theory-which
is at issue in the principal case, had its first full statement in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,2 8 in which the Supreme Court held that

the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment ran against a lessee of
public property when the lessee and the state were engaged in a mutual-

ly beneficial venture.2 9 Various factors established the symbiotic relationship in Burton: the operation of the lessee's restaurant within a

public parking garage that provided the restaurant with additional
demand for its services and with convenient parking facilities for its
patrons, and the state's dependence for financing its garage on the rental

receipts from its commercial lessees in the building. 0
Using the state involvement theory, lower federal courts have frequently found that leases of public property, when accompanied by
other ties between the state and the private activity, establish the requisite nexus between the state and the challenged private conduct.

These cases typically have involved situations in which the state has attempted through a lease to exercise some control over the lessee's con-

duct or to secure additional benefits for the state. 1 Leases have not
been sufficient to constitute state action in a few cases in which the
alleged constitutional violation did not involve racial discrimination 2 or
28. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
29. See id. at 724-26.
30. See id. at 724.
31. See Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965) (lessee barred
from discriminating against blacks where lease of county land required lessee to build a
golf course subject to county's approval of plans, gave county powers designed to keep
golf course open to general public, and vested title to all improvements in county);
Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957)
(lessee of courthouse basement barred from denying cafeteria service to blacks where
express purpose of lease was to furnish cafeteria service for benefit of persons frequenting courthouse). But cf. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (barring racially segregated operation of private golf
courses where owner purchased the courses from city and where the land would revert to
the city should the land fail to be used as golf courses); Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc.,
180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960) (lessee barred from continuing segregated seating
arrangements where lease of theatre located in city hall granted city right to use the
premises four days per year).
32. See Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975) (White, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting) (allowing private hospital to refuse to permit physician to perform elective abortions where
county built and leased hospital to defendant for nominal consideration but had no
control over hospital policies). Contra, O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial
Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973) (reversing dismissal of section 1983 claim against
private hospital which refused to permit plaintiff doctor to practice there when hospital
leased from county for nominal consideration under contract that required specified
number of official members on defendant's board of directors).
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in which a lease had little or no connection with the challenged practice.

33

Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis3 4 and Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co.,-" which refused to find
state action, restricted the use of the state involvement theory enunciated
in Burton. 8 Although the facts of both of these non-lease cases could
easily have been the basis for finding a Burton mutually beneficial
relationship, the Supreme Court required that the state be directly
involved in the challenged private conduct when the challenged action is
initiated by the private entity and not the state."' This new requirement
retreats significantly from the view implicit in Burton that the state
becomes inextricably involved in a private party's discriminatory practices whenever the state and the private individual have formed a
38
mutually beneficial relationship.
At a time when the Supreme Court is restricting 9 the use of the
state action concept, the Fifth Circuit in Golden is increasing its scope.
The court's holding that a lease of public property ipso facto establishes
state involvement when the lessee practices racial discrimination is a
significant departure from earlier state action cases involving leases. In
Burton the Supreme Court expressly noted that not all leases of public
property would constitute state action. 40 Indeed, the great pains taken
in Burton41 and other lease cases 42 to establish additional links between
the state and private defendants accused of racial discrimination would
have been needless if a lease itself could have sufficed to constitute state
action. One Fifth Circuit lease case, Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 8
33. See Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973)
(dismissing suit by blacks to enjoin allegedly discriminatory membership practices of
private clubs and federation where federation leased land for its state headquarters from
a municipality for nominal consideration under a contract requiring lessee to build office
which would revert to city and to pay taxes on building).
34. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
35. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
36. Note, Termination of Electrical Service Does Not Constitute State Action lor
Purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 EmORY L.J. 510, 525 (1975); Note, Public
Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After Jackson, 53 N.C.L. REv. 817,
823-24 (1975); see Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840, 847
(1974).
37. See 419 U.S. at 351, 358; 407 U.S. at 176-77; Note, 60 VA. L. Rav., supra note
36, at 849-50.
38. See generally Note, 24 EMoRY LJ., supra note 36, at 529.
39. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
40. 365 U.S. at 725-26.
41. See id. at 722-25.
42. Cases cited note 31 supra.
43. 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965).
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which the court in Golden cited, 44 supports this reading of Burton. In
that case the Fifth Circuit explicitly relied on the lease's additional
provisions to tie the state to the private endeavor.4 5
In holding that an unadorned lease could constitute state action,
the court in Golden appears to have ignored the Moose Lodge-Jackson
requirement that the state be directly involved in the private conduct
that is being challenged. The Golden majority held that Moose Lodge
was not controlling because that case involved a license instead of a
lease.4 6 This attempt at distinguishing Golden from Moose Lodge was
much too simplistic since the rationale of the Moose Lodge and Jackson
holdings does not appear to be limited to licensing situations. Applied
in a leasing situation, the Moose Lodge-Jackson requirement would
dictate that the state be directly involved in its lessee's discriminatory
conduct.
The Fifth Circuit in Golden was not compelled to hold that a lease
when coupled with racially disciminatory practices constituted sufficient
state involvement in order to enjoin those practices under section 1983.
The court could have employed the fuller Burton analysis as modified
by Moose Lodge and Jackson to find state action in this case.
Golden's facts would clearly seem to fulfill the state involvement
theory's basic requirement of a mutually beneficial relationship. The
lease of the bay bottom land provided the Club with docks essential to
its existence and with financial subsidization through the token rental
fee. 7 These benefits seem more important to the Club in Golden than
the convenient parking and increased patronage 8 that the lease in
Burton provided the Eagle Restaurant. The lease in Golden also benefitted the City of Miami since the existence of private dock facilities
relieved the city from having to provide more public dock facilities.49
The benefits to the City of Miami seem at least as important as the
benefits5" provided the state in Burton where the receipts from the lease
helped defray the cost of providing parking facilities for the public. In
addition, other state involvement lease cases have found state action
44. 521 F.2d at 352.
45. 342 F.2d at 805-06. The Wimbish lease contained provisions that gave the
county effective control over plans for construction of a golf course which was closed to
blacks, control over membership and greens fees, and title to all improvements. Id.
46. 521 F.2d at 353.
47. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
48. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
49. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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when the primary benefit to the public entities came from the private
provision of recreational facilities open to their citizens.,"
Not only do the facts in Golden satisfy Burton but they also meet
the Moose Lodge-Jackson requirement. The city is directly implicated
in the Club's discriminatory membership practices in two ways. First,
the city's failure to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions 2 in its
lease represents, at a minimum, an acquiescence in the Club's discriminatory practices. 53 More importantly, any time a state provides a scarce
public resource for the exclusive use of a private club that has discriminatory membership practices, the state effectively allocates the public
resource in a discriminatory manner.54
Although Golden's holding appears to be a sweeping one, the Fifth
Circuit expressly restricted the applicability of its finding of state action
to situations in which racial or religious discrimination is present." The
court was compelled to do this because of its inability to distinguish an
earlier Fifth Circuit case56 which did not involve racial discrimination
and in which the leasing of a publicly owned facility to be operated as a
private hospital was held not to constitute state action. The rationale the
51. See cases cited in note 31 supra.
52. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
53. But cf. note 27 supra.
54. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Coleman argued that since the city does not
exercise any control over the Club's internal matters, the case does not satisfy the
requisite connection that Moose Lodge and Jackson demand and argued that the decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York Jaycees, Inc. v. United
States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975), should be followed. In that case, the Second
Circuit held that federal funding of public service projects was not a sufficient nexus to
attack discriminatory membership policies when non-members were the beneficiaries of
the projects. New York Jaycees is inapposite to Golden because the members in Golden
are the exclusive beneficiaries of the dock facilities and the financial subsidization that
flow from the lease of public land.
It is possible to argue that Moose Lodge implicitly rejected the argument contained
in the text because no state action was found to inhere when members of the lodge
received the benefits that stemmed from a liquor license. On the other hand, Moose
Lodge is distinguishable from Golden because in Moose Lodge there was no finding that
the liquor license was essential to the lodge's existence and the Court used standing
grounds to turn back the attack on the discriminatory membership practices. See 407
U.S. at 164-79. Moose Lodge is a perplexing case because the indicia of state action
which the decisionj lays out could be satisfied on the case's facts. See The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 50, 73 (1972).
55. See 521 F.2d at 350-53. Although the cases the majority cited to justify its
position all involve racial discrimination, -the majority equates religious discrimination to
racial discrimination because it "carries the same stigma of inferiority and badge of
opprobrium. ... ." Id. at 351.
56. Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 433 (1975) (White, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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court gave for attacking racially motivated constitutional violations more
vigorously than other violations was that such denials "precipitated
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 57 Whatever the original
impetus behind the fourteenth amendment's enactment, its protection

has been extended to all citizens. If other challenged private actions are
constitutional violations, there would seem to be no reason to permit

them to go unredressed unless there are countervailing policy reasons.
58
The Golden court failed to mention any.

While lower federal courts have split over whether a lesser degree

of state involvement is required to proscribe private racial discrimination
than to proscribe other constitutional violations,5 9 the Supreme Court

has not expressly embraced either view.60 The Golden majority, citing
the results of a number of Supreme Court cases, attributed to the Court
an unwillingness to condone any degree of state involvement in cases

involving racially discriminatory conduct. 61 The Fifth Circuit, however, ignored the Supreme Court case most directly on point with
Golden-Moose Lodge-in which the high Court upheld a private
club's right to refuse to serve a black guest.6"

In that case the Supreme

Court seemed to give greater weight to the associational rights of the
private defendant than to the black plaintiffs interests.6"

Although the

Court rested its holding on the lack of direct state involvement in the
discriminatory conduct, commentators have suggested that the high
Court must have been influenced by the defendant's associational rights
57. 521 F.2d at 351.
58. The Golden court implied that there might be countervailing policy reasons.
See id. at 350 n.12. The majority cited Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513
F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975), to the effect that
the "potentially explosive impact of the application of state action concepts designed to ferret out racially discriminatory policies in areas unaffected by racial
considerations has led courts to define more precisely the applicability of the state action
doctrine." 521 F.2d at 350 n.12. The Golden court, however, excluded the most likely
countervailing reason: the Club's associational rights. See text accompanying note 70
infra.
59. See Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d
Cir. 1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Powe
v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437
F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp.
Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968). Contra, O'Neill v. Grayson County War
Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1143-44 n.3 (6th Cir. 1973).
60. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
61. 521 F.2d at 350, 351 n.14.
62. See 407 U.S. 163.
63. See id.
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because the other facts of the case are indistinguishable from earlier
64
cases finding state action.
The Supreme Court's handling of Moose Lodge and other recent
state action cases has suggested to commentators that the high Court is
actually employing a state action analysis that balances the rights of
plaintiffs against the competing interests of private defendants in deciding whether there is state action.6 5 One commentator has argued that
such a covert balancing approach obscures the basic issues involved in
answering whether the fourteenth amendment should run against private
individuals in a given case. 66 He recommended using a two-stage
analysis which balances conflicting constitutional rights of the parties
after an initial determination that the state is involved in the challenged
conduct. 67 The Supreme Court has not expressly adopted such an
approach but instead has continued overtly to rest its decisions solely on
the failure to find a sufficient quantum of state involvement in the
private conduct.6
The high Court's failure to explain the considerations that lie at the
heart of its decisions, when added to the "sifting facts and weighing
circumstances" approach of the state action cases, permits haphazard
results as lower courts pick and choose among conflicting Supreme
Court opinions for guidance. 69 It also promotes haphazard consideration of the competing policies at stake. For instance, the Fifth Circuit
in Golden, while emphasizing the invidious nature of racial discrimination, perfunctorily disposed of the Club's associational rights in a single
paragraph by asserting that the private exercise of freedom of association deserves no consitutional protection when it involves state action.70
Yet this is in conflict with the weight seemingly given private associational rights in Moose Lodge in the face of charges of racial discrimina64. See Note, 60 VA. L. REv., supra note 36, at 849-50; cf. Note, 53 N.C.L.
REv., supra note 36, at 825-26.
65. Note, 53 N.C.L. REv., supra note 36, at 825; see Note, Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery: Is There More to Equal Protection Than State Action?, 53 N.C.L. REV.
545, 550 (1975); Note, 60 VA. L. REv., supra note 36, at 850.
66. Note, 53 N.C.L. REv., supranote 65.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 549-50.
69. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 49, 150 (1975).
70. 521 F.2d at 353. For a discussion of the absolutionist approach to associational freedom, see Note, 60 VA. L. REv., supra note 36, at 854-63. For an argument that a
rule of reason should be employed to balance the competing values, see Black, The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and Californa's Proposition14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 101-03 (1967). For a discussion of how and
when the rights of private individuals should give way to constitutional proscriptions, see
Note, 74 CoLuM. L. REv., supra note 27.
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tion. While in Golden the rights of religious and racial minorities may
well outweigh the Club's associational rights, the case, as the firstf 1
imposition of fourteenth amendment duties on what would traditionally
have been considered a private club, warrants a much fuller discussion
of the associational freedoms of the Club.
In sum, Golden's assault on the Club's membership practices was
misplaced because the Fifth Circuit refused to base its holding solely on
a Burton-Moose Lodge-Jackson state involvement analysis. Its reliance
on the lease as an adequate basis for finding state action seems to run
counter to the latest pronouncements on the issue by the Supreme Court.
The court's overly broad construction of state action was partly excusable because the Supreme Court has not articulated the relative importance it attaches to the nature of the constitutional right asserted by
plaintiffs and the countervailing interests of private defendants. Unless
the high Court dispels the confusion that has arisen from its handling of
these cases, state action assaults on private discrimination will continue
to be hit-or-miss attacks.
MICHAEL W. PAmIcK

Criminal Procedure-Michigan v. Mosley: A New Constitutional
Procedure
In Miranda v. Arizona' the United States Supreme Court set out
specific guidelines, which, if not followed, required that statements obtained through custodial interrogation not be used against the accused.'
71. This conclusion depends on which definition of private club is used. Using the
definition discussed at note 17 supra, Golden represents the first decision imposing
constitutional restrictions on membership in a private social club. See 521 F.2d at 353
(Coleman, J., dissenting). But cf. Goodloe v. Davis, 514 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1975).
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Briefly stated Mirandaheld:
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege of self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right to remain silent and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain si-

